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Abstract
This paper investigates, ﬁrst, how allowance for subsistence ac-
tivities, or home production, aﬀects the standard results in models
involving the majority choice of the tax rate in a ﬂat tax—basic in-
come scheme. The paper extends the analysis of home production to
choices regarding the composition of government expenditure, in situ-
ations where there is a tax-ﬁnanced pure public good in addition to a
transfer payment, conditional on a given tax rate. The eﬀect of home
production is to reduce the transfer payment in each model, but the
eﬀect is small.
∗Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Aus-
tralia.
11 Introduction
Early approaches to examining the democratic choice of the size of govern-
ment involved a simple model of a transfer payment in the form of a basic
income combined with a proportional tax, with endogenous labour supply
responses; these include Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1978).1
The government budget constraint implies that voting is over only one di-
mension, the tax rate. Despite the existence of double-peaked preferences, a
majority-voting equilibrium is known to exist as long as there is ‘hierarchical
adherence’, such that the ordering of individuals by income is independent
of the tax rate.2 The median voter’s preferred tax rate can be established
as a function of the ratio of the median wage rate to the arithmetic mean
wage, such that an increase in the skewness of the wage rate distribution (a
reduction in the ratio) is associated with a higher equilibrium tax rate, that,
is a more redistributive tax-transfer system.3 However, empirical evidence
regarding such a relationship, involving cross-country data, has been mixed;
for a review, see Borck (2007) and Harms and Zink (2003). In the context
of time series evidence for particular countries, the variation in inequality is
typically too small to establish an eﬀect.
The aim of this paper is to investigate how allowance for subsistence
activities, or home production, in the model aﬀects the standard results. For
example, there may be a larger ‘tax base eﬀect’ of an increase in the tax
rate, where individuals can substitute home production for goods purchased
in markets as well as substituting between leisure and work. This may result
in lower tax rates, ceteris paribus. Tridimas and Winer (2005) consider the
quasi-linear utility function with home production. They only concentrate
1Extensions within the Robert-Meltzer-Richard framework include, for example,
Galasso (2003) who considers fairness and redistribution.
2Double-peaked preferences exist for some individuals because, after the point where
they move to the non-participation corner solution, they prefer to see the tax rate increase
until total revenue reaches a maximum. Results regarding the existence of voting equilibria
were established by Roberts (1977).




¯ ¯,w h e r e
ym and ¯ y are respectively the median and arithmetic mean gross income,a n d
¯ ¯ηy,τ
¯ ¯ is the
absolute elasticity of average income with respect to the tax rate, τ. The left hand side of
this expression can be interpreted as a measure of income inequality.
2on public goods and linear income tax and use the probabilistic voting model
to ﬁnd collective choice.
This paper also extends the analysis of home production to demographic
choices regarding the composition of government expenditure, in situations
where there is a tax-ﬁnanced pure public good in addition to a transfer pay-
ment, conditional on a given tax rate. Hence, as so often in practice, there
is a separation between taxing and expenditure decisions.4 Again the role of
the government budget constraint means that voting is unidimensional.5 In
this context, Creedy and Moslehi (2009) established a positive relationship
between inequality and the proportion of expenditure devoted to the (in-
equality reducing) transfer payment, corresponding to the result mentioned
a b o v ec o n c e r n i n gt h ec h o i c eo ft a xr a t e .T h ei n ﬂuence of home production
on this relationship is thus examined here.
Section 2 considers voting over the tax rate in a simple model in which
there are two goods, one of which is produced at home, in addition to leisure.
Section 3 considers the case where voting concerns the division of government
expenditure between transfer payments and a pure public good, conditional
on a given tax rate. Brief conclusions are in Section 4.
2 Marketed and Home Produced Goods
This section extends the widely used basic model of a pure tax and transfer
system to allow for home production. To obtain some idea of likely orders of
magnitude, it is useful to obtain explicit solutions for the majority choice of
4Bearse et al. (2001), who examine majority voting over a uniform transfer and public
education, also assume that the tax rate is given exogenously. After pointing out that this
is a common assumption, Tridimas (2001, p. 308) suggests that, ‘This is less restrictive
than it ﬁrst appears, since in practice governments are often constrained in the policy
instruments that they may vary at anyone time’. Tridimas and Winer (2005) consider
voting over only tax-ﬁnanced public goods. On diﬃculties raised by multidimentional
voting, see Mueller (2003, pp. 87-92).
5In some models, a two-stage process is envisaged in which voting over the tax rate
takes place, where voters have information about the conditional choice of government
expenditure.
3the tax rate, using a speciﬁc form for the utility function.6 Of course, some
results can easily be obtained without the need to assume speciﬁcf o r m s .
Thus in a diagram with the basic income, or transfer payment, on the verti-
cal axis and the proportional tax rate on the horizontal axis, individuals with
lower wage rates have ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves. Each voter’s preferred po-
sition involves a tangency between the highest (upward sloping) indiﬀerence
curve and the concave government budget constraint. Hence the lower the
median relative to the mean, the higher is the majority choice of tax rate.7
To obtain the majority voting equilibrium tax rate in a pure transfer
system consisting of a basic untaxed income and a proportional tax rate, it
is necessary to derive each individual’s indirect utility function expressed in
terms of the tax rate. The government budget constraint means that there
i sj u s to n ed e g r e eo ff r e e d o mi nt h ec h o i c eo ft h et w ot a xp a r a m e t e r s ,s o
that voting is unidimensional. The indirect utility function, along with the
budget constraint, is derived in subsection 2.1, and the voting equilibrium is
obtained in subsection 2.2. The eﬀects on the choice of tax rate of variations
in preferences for, or the eﬃciency of, home production are examined in
subsection 2.3.
2.1 Indirect Utility
Suppose that individual i buys an amount, xi, of a marketed good at price,





It is assumed that other inputs into home production, arising from endow-
ments of the individual, are ﬁxed and therefore subsumed into the term, θ.
These endowments may include, for example, a ﬁxed holding of land and
capital goods in the form of tools. If the production function were to involve
6Hindricks and Myles (2006, pp. 503-5) discuss majority voting in the simple case
where utility is consumption less (half) the square of labour supply, and show that the
median voter’s preferred tax rate is (1 − ym/¯ y)/{2 − ym/¯ y}. Persson and Tabellini (2000,
chapter 6) also give an example using quasi-linear preferences.
7For example, see Mueller (1989, pp. 512-514)
4inputs of amounts of the market-purchased good, x, the model would become
signiﬁcantly more complex.8 The individual consumes  i units of leisure and
t h et o t a le n d o w m e n to ft i m ei s1, so that the time devoted to paid work is




















Writing β = δφ and ignoring the constant θ








It is convenient below to write α + β + γ = ρ. The standard model, which
excludes home production, is thus obtained by setting β =0 . Utility there-
f o r et a k e st h eb a s i cC o b b - D o u g l a sf o r mi nt e r m so ft h ec o n s u m p t i o no fa
market-purchased good and the time devoted, separately, to leisure and home
production.10 The latter does not generate utility directly but does so via
the production function in (1).
With a tax and transfer system involving a proportional tax applied to
all earnings at the rate, τ, and a basic income of b, the individual’s budget
constraint, where wi is the wage rate, is given by:
pxi + wi (1 − τ)(hi +  i)=wi (1 − τ)+b = Mi (5)
8Greenwood et al. (1995) allow for the purchase of inputs, in a real business cycle
model.
9An alternative way of looking at home production is to suppose that, instead of having
two goods, one of which can be produced at home, there is just one good which may either
be produced at home or purchased at price p. From the point of view of consumption, they
are otherwise the same. Home and market amounts consumed are xs and xp respectively.
Utility is thus Ui =( xp + xs)
α  1−α,w h e r exs = θhδ
s. A problem is that this formulation
becomes intractable.
10If a CES utility function were used instead of (2), this would not, when combined
with (1), give rise to an equivalent CES in terms of hours of home production, as does (4).
Furthermore, the CES does not give rise to a linear relationship between earnings and the
wage rate, so the government budget constraint is considerably more complex than the
case below.
5where Mi is ‘full income’.11 Using the standard properties of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function, involving ﬁxed expenditure proportions, the indi-

















wi (1 − τ)
(8)
Thus, as expected, high wage individuals devote relatively more time to
working in the labour market, rather than taking leisure or engaging in home
production. Where the opportunity cost of time is lower, it is better to spend
more time in home production. The indirect utility function is obtained by
substituting individual’s optimum values into (4), so that:
Vi = k{wi (1 − τ)}
α−ρ (wi (1 − τ)+b)
ρ (9)
The gross earnings, yi, of each individual is obtained from optimum val-
ues. Therefore:
















This expression takes precisely the same form as the case where there is no
home production: the only diﬀerence concerns the value of the coeﬃcients on
the wage rate and the basic income. This clearly applies only if wi exceeds a










11This of course envisages the individual selling all the endowment, that is one unit, of
labour time at the going wage and ‘buying back’ the time required for leisure and home
production at a price given by the net wage.
6The government’s budget constraint in this ‘pure’ transfer scheme is given
by:
b = τ¯ y (13)



















and letting F1 (wmin) and F (wmin) denote respectively the proportion of total
wage (rates) and the proportion of people with w<w min:12
¯ y =¯ w
α
ρ








{1 − F (wmin)} (15)
This expression is highly nonlinear in view of the fact that wmin depends
on b and τ, so it is not possible to express b as a convenient function of τ.
However, the analysis is tractable if it is assumed that all individuals work,
that is if all wi >w min and therefore F1 and F are equal to zero. This












¢ = α¯ w
τ (1 − τ)
ρ − ατ
(16)
The assumption that all wages are suﬃcient to avoid the non-participation
corner solution for relevant tax rates therefore simpliﬁes the form of the
g o v e r n m e n t ’ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tb u to t h e r w i s eh a sl i t t l ee ﬀect on the model:
as mentioned earlier, the possibility of double-peaked preferences does not
prevent a voting equilibrium from arising.
Substituting (16) into full income gives:












Substituting optimal values and (17) into the individual’s utility function
gives indirect utility, Vi, in terms of the tax rate, τ,a s :












12These correspond to the ordinate and abscissa of the Lorenz curve of wage rates at
the point where w = wmin.
7Where k = ααβ
βγγ/(ρρpα) depends on the price of goods in the market and
the parameters of the utility function.
2.2 The Majority Choice of Tax Rate
This model is known to satisfy hierarchical adherence, so the median voter
theorem can be invoked and, denoting the median wage by wm,t h em a j o r i t y



































































The two roots of this quadratic equation are examined in Appendix A where
it is shown that the largest root can be ruled out as it is greater than one.

























A standard result in the literature on majority voting is that an increase
in wage rate inequality is associated with an increase in the median voter’s










there is no home production, so that U = xα
i  
1−α
i , it can be seen that the right hand side





b , or the elasticity of b with






























8desired tax rate and thus transfer payment, making the system more redis-
tributive. Redistribution in this model is of course across the arithmetic
mean, since the eﬀective average tax rate is negative for yi < ¯ y and positive
for yi > ¯ y. Hence, as the median wage tends to the arithmetic mean wage,
the majority choice of tax rate tends to τm =0 .
It is therefore of interest to see if this result is modiﬁed where home
production exists. In this context the ratio wm/¯ w, which is more clearly
a measure of skewness of the wage rate distribution, is directly related to
inequality. For example, if w is lognormally distributed as Λ(w|µ,σ2) where
µ and σ2 are respectively the mean and variance of logarithms, it can be
shown that wm/¯ w depends only on σ2. The derivative of the tax rate, τm,

































It can be shown that the term in curly brackets in (22) is negative, since this













negative so that increasing the degree of equality, that is, reducing inequality,
reduces the majority choice of tax rate.
2.3 Variations in Beta
The question of interest here is how the existence of home production aﬀects
t h ec h o i c eo ft a xr a t e .D i ﬀerentiation of both (21) and (22) with respect to β,
bearing in mind that ρ = α+β+γ, does not yield unequivocal results. How-
ever, further insight can be obtained by considering individuals’ preference
in (b,τ) space. The majority voting equilibrium is characterised by tangency
between the median voter’s indiﬀerence curve and the government budget
constraint. With b and τ on vertical and horizontal axes respectively, any
change leading indiﬀerence curves of the median voter to become steeper,
and the government budget constraint (over the relevant — that is upward
sloping — range) to become ﬂatter, has the eﬀect of unambiguously reducing
the choice of tax rate.
9The indirect utility function for workers in terms of b and τ can be written
(dropping subscripts for the median voter) as:





wi (1 − τ)
¶ρ
(23)
The slope of an indiﬀerence curve is:
db
dτ











wi (1 − τ)
¶
(24)
The sign of the ﬁrst derivative is undetermined; however it can be shown
that over the relevant range of taxes it is increasing. On the other hand
the negative sign of the second derivative, −(ρ − α)b/ρ(1 − τ)
2,s h o w st h a t
indiﬀerence curves are concave in (b, τ) space.15 This property does not seem
to have been recognised in the literature; for instance, Mueller (2003, p. 514)
draws upward sloping convex indiﬀerence curve for workers.
















wi (1 − τ)
¶
< 0 (25)
and for a given τ the indiﬀerence curves get ﬂatter. A change in β also causes
the government budget constraint, b = τ¯ y, to change. The slope of this is:
db
dτ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
R































{wi (1 − τ)}
ρ−α
















i (1 − τ)
−α
ρ + wi. The sign of this is undetermined. However,
it applies only for the range of τ for which labour supply is positive, and is there positive.
For τ beyond the point where the individual does not work, the indiﬀerence curves become

















i (1 − τ)
−α
ρ −1 < 0.
This is negative, implying that indiﬀerence curve are actually slightly concave in b, τ
space.























































Hence the government budget constraint also becomes ﬂatter. This means
that there are opposing tendencies on the preferred value of τ.T h eﬂattening
of the indiﬀerence curves leads towards an increase in τ while the ﬂattening
of the budget constraint leads towards a reduction in τ.T h u st h eq u e s t i o n ,
in determining whether the change in β leads to a reduction in the median
v o t e r ’ sc h o i c eo fτ, is whether the change (in absolute terms) in the slope of
the budget constraint is greater than that of the indiﬀerence curve, at the
initial τ.S i n c ewm < ¯ w and 0 < 1 − τ<1, it can be seen that:
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Vi
!¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(32)
An increase in β therefore reduces τm. This is illustrated in Figure 1,
which shows the variation in τm with wm/¯ w f o rar a n g eo fv a l u e so fβ.I n
producing the ﬁgure, the value of α i ss e tt o0 . 7a n di ti sc o n v e n i e n tt os e t
γ =1− α (so that ρ =1+β). The introduction of home production, or
an increase in β, not only reduces the value of τm but also involves a very
slight reduction in the extent to which it varies with wm/¯ w.A n i n c r e a s e
in β can arise from either an increase in preferences for the home produced
good, φ, or an increase in the productivity of time spent in home production,
δ. In each case there is a stronger incentive to devote more time to home
production, involving a greater opportunity cost of working. The median


































Figure 1: Median Voter’s Preferred Tax Rate and Ratio wm/¯ w
It is also of interest to consider the way in which time allocation varies as
β increases. The introduction of home production, or an increase in labour
productivity in home production, is expected to involve a shift away from
leisure. It is shown here that it also leads to a small reduction in labour
supply. First, the partial eﬀects on leisure,  , and time in home production,








































Hence η ,β +ηh,β =1 .A ni n c r e a s ei nβ therefore leads to a shift from leisure
towards home production, but the two changes are not equal: there is a small
12eﬀect on labour supply. Thus:












ρ2wi (1 − τ)
< 0 (37)
Hence, the partial eﬀect of an increase in β is to reduce labour supply for all
wage groups. However, the increase in β has been seen above to lead to a
r e d u c t i o ni nt h em a j o r i t yc h o i c eo fτ and a reduction in the value of b,s i n c e
the government budget constraint becomes ﬂatter. The latter reduction has
the eﬀect of increasing labour supply. Hence the change in labour supply
resulting from both changes depends on the individual’s wage rate.
3 Composition of Expenditure with a Public
Good
This section extends the model of Section 2 by introducing a pure public good
which is tax ﬁnanced, and examine the majority choice of the composition
of government expenditure; that is, it derives the median voter’s preferred
allocation of tax revenue between transfer payments and the public good.16
In concentrating on the composition of expenditure, the tax rate is considered
to be exogenously determined, as mentioned in the introduction. This means
that there is again only one degree of freedom in choosing the transfer and
public good expenditure and voting concerns just one dimension.
Consider the model in Section 2 which has two goods, one of which is
produced at home. Suppose that, in addition, there is a tax-ﬁnanced amount
of a pure public good, QG, where the cost of production per unit is constant
and equal to pG, (the price of the private marketed good is p,a sa b o v e ) .T h e










The budget constraint facing each individual is the same as in (5). The utility
maximising amounts, xi, hi and  i a r ee x a c t l yt h es a m ea si ne q u a t i o n s( 6 )
16This section therefore extends the results of Creedy and Moslehi (2009), whose model
does not include home production.
13to (8) in Section 2. Similarly, individual i’s earnings are the same as given
in (11).
However, the form the government budget constraint in (13) must be
modiﬁed to allow for the need to raise extra revenue to ﬁnance expenditure of
G = pGQG on the public good. The government budget constraint becomes:
b = τ¯ y − G/N (39)
Where N is the number of individuals. Hence (16) is easily modiﬁed by the
inclusion of the term in G/N,s ot h a t :
b =
α









where again ρ = α + β + γ. Instead of looking for the individual’s preferred
tax rate, the problem here is to obtain the preferred expenditure levels of
G and b for a given tax rate. The indirect utility function modiﬁed by the
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By substituting the transfer payment from the government budget constraint
(40) the indirect utility function is written in term of one policy variable, QG.







{wi (1 − τ)}
ρ−α
½







It can be shown that d2Vi/dQ2
G < 0 if α+β +γ is less than one. Hence pref-
erences are singled-peaked and the majority choice of expenditure on public























14Hence the expenditure per capita on the public good, as a proportion of ¯ w,
depends on the preference parameters, the tax rate, and the ratio wm/¯ w.I t
increases linearly with τ and wm/¯ w. The resulting value of bm is given by




















and bm/¯ w is also a linear function of wm/¯ w, but a nonlinear function of the
exogenous tax rate, τ. The ratio of expenditure on transfers to expenditure
on the public good is therefore a function of wm/¯ w. An important implication
of the Cobb-Douglas preferences is that this does not depend on the cost of
t h ep u b l i cg o o dp e ru n i tr e l a t i v et ot h ep r i c eo ft h em a r k e t e dp r i v a t eg o o d .
Combining (44) and (43) shows that the majority choice of the ratio of the
transfer payment to public good expenditure per capita, Rm, depends on
the given tax rate, the preference parameters and, importantly, the ratio,
wm/¯ w. Further analysis shows that dRm/d(wm/¯ w) < 0,s ot h a ti n c r e a s i n g
equality is associated with a lower Rm and hence a reduced emphasis on a
redistributive expenditure share.17
Figure 2 shows the relationship between Rm and wm/¯ w,a g a i nf o rα =
0.7 and γ =1− α,f o rt h r e ed i ﬀerent values of β. It can be seen that
home production, as modelled here, has little eﬀect on this relationship.
Just as it involved a slightly lower tax rate, and hence transfer payment,
when considering voting over the tax rate, it implies a slightly lower ratio of
expenditure on transfers relative to the public good.
4 Conclusions
This paper has examined the implications of allowing for home production
in modelling two types of democratic choice. First, majority voting over tax
and beneﬁt levels was examined in a pure transfer system with endogenous
labour supply. Second, the choice of the share of transfer payments in total
17Empirical support for this, for the case where β =0 , is reported in Creedy and Solmaz



























Figure 2: Expenditure Share and Wage Ratio
expenditure was considered in a model in which the tax rate is exogenously
ﬁxed but there is also a tax-ﬁnanced pure public good. The speciﬁcation of
home production implies that a Cobb-Douglas utility function in terms of
amounts consumed of a marketed good and a home produced good (along
with leisure) can be re-expressed as a function of the time devoted to home
production. The analysis was simpliﬁed by the assumption that the mini-
mum wage in the population is suﬃcient to ensure that all individuals work,
producing a convenient form of government budget constraint which allows
explicit solutions to be obtained. Both the tax rate in the ﬁrst model and
the expenditure share in the second model were found to depend on the ratio
of the median voter’s wage to the arithmetic wage. This general property
has of course been established earlier for models which make no allowance
for home production.
The eﬀect of introducing home production in these models was found
to have little eﬀect on the democratic choice of tax and transfer levels and
on the choice of expenditure composition. Attempts to examine these re-
lationships empirically using cross-sectional data for a range of democratic
countries, even where the extent of home production may be expected to
16vary signiﬁcantly, are therefore not likely to be signiﬁcantly biased by ignor-
ing home production. This negative result is in fact convenient for empirical
work, given the diﬃculty of obtaining information regarding the time spent
in home production.
17Appendix A: Majority Voting and Two Roots
of the Quadratic
In order to ﬁnd the majority choice of tax rate the two roots of the quadratic
equation (20) need to be examined. Writing this quadratic as Aτ2+Bτ+C =







The term B2 − 4AC is given by:
B





















which, after rearranging, becomes:
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Of the three terms in parentheses, only the middle term is negative. Hence
this condition always holds. Therefore only the lowest root needs to be
considered.
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